The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has
published a 15,000-word summary and analysis of the tenth session of the
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) acting as the Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD),
which took place from 27 May to 7 June 2002 in Bali, Indonesia. 

The Web version of this Earth Negotiations Bulletin  report is available at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/vol22/enb2241e.html and in printable PDF format
at http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb2241e.pdf 

We have attached a portion of this report, "A Brief Analysis of PrepCom IV."

Kimo

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF PREPCOM IV 
((c) IISD)

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE RAISING THE STAKES, A SECOND TIME AROUND

PrepCom IV's failure to complete its work on the Draft Plan of
Implementation for the WSSD was not unexpected. Indeed, early in the
second week, the NGO community began to urge negotiators to bring their
brackets to Johannesburg rather than settle for a bad deal; delegations
obliged, but not only for this reason.

The outstanding issues fall into two categories. The first and perhaps
fundamental set of issues that led to stalemate concern finance, terms of
trade and globalization, and the Rio Principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. These issues are best described as the
confidence-building architecture that underpins the 1992 UNCED outcomes.
These are the elements required to muster the trust, participation and
cooperation of developing countries before the WSSD. A second set of issues
concerns the development of the Programme of Work spawned by Agenda 21,
including a series of time-bound targets. Progress on these and other
issues will only be unlocked when confidence is regained in the process.

This brief analysis will examine the background to the deadlock at the
PrepCom IV negotiations of the means of implementation section of the Draft
Plan of Implementation, review other programmatic issues, and comment on
procedural questions and future prospects for the Summit. 

WAS THE DECK ALREADY STACKED? 

A major focus at Bali was the gap in implementation of Agenda 21. The
most important fault line in the discourse on sustainable development
since 1992 has been the failure to address the key confidence-building
challenges of equity and fairness. While national trends in economic growth
are mixed, there is a widening gap between the rich and poor - a trend that
underlines the "broken promise" of Rio. This rift plays a key role in
locking the sustainable development debate into a series of stand-offs
between developed and developing countries over access to finance and a
fair trading system. 

Within the confines of environment and sustainable development
negotiations, the gap in implementation can be attributed to a failure of
political will on the part of industrialized countries since 1992. On
questions of finance for development, such as ODA levels, lack of political
will amounts to a sufficient explanation. Taking a wider view, an important
- if not decisive - explanatory factor, according to a number of NGOs in
Bali, was the fact that "Rio" was trumped by Marrakesh and the formation of
the WTO. Any prospect of a post-1992 policy-led global architecture capable
of meeting the needs of the poorest was subverted by the ascendancy of
trade liberalization and an unleashing of the disciplinary forces of
corporate-led globalization. The WSSD presents an opportunity for world
leaders to face up to the contradictions embedded in the architecture of
global governance when it comes to trade and sustainable development. In
the language of the new UNEP Global Environmental Outlook report, the
choice is to pursue either a "Markets First" scenario or a "Sustainability
First" scenario where global policy is no longer the servant of the trade
regime.

WHEN TO HOLD, WHEN TO FOLD

Ultimately, after nearly two solid weeks of tedious negotiations
following two previous PrepComs, and what many participants commended as
excellent logistical arrangements, negotiations on the Draft Plan of
Implementation broke down when the impasse on trade and finance issues
could not be resolved. South Africa's Mohammad Valli Moosa, charged with
breaking the stalemate, presented negotiators on Friday morning with a
package put together after a number of behind-the-scenes high-level
consultations. One of the key inputs to the package emerged from a meeting
on Thursday between the EU and the G-77/China, and an informal non-paper
tabled by the EU. 

The G-77/China spent three hours debating the Moosa deal, which met
strong internal resistance as a "weak" and unacceptable compromise on
finance and trade issues for developing countries. Nevertheless, the
G-77/China arrived at a fragile agreement to go along with the deal,
subject to its unconditional acceptance by the other negotiating
partners. 

Although Mexico, New Zealand and Norway accepted the Moosa deal, the EU
ultimately failed to keep all of its members on board in the face of
unpalatable language on subsidies. Moreover, the US and Japan raised over a
dozen objections and indicated that they could not accept the deal without
amendments and/or further negotiations. Australia and Canada also had
difficulties with the deal. Some observers noted that part of the inability
to make progress on trade and finance issues was reflective of the problems
in integrating the three pillars of sustainable development: Doha was
negotiated by trade ministers; Monterrey by finance ministers; while the
Summit process has been flooded with environment and foreign affairs
ministers. The Moosa deal was taken off the table once negotiations
collapsed, and discussions going into the Summit itself will be based on
the Facilitator's latest draft.

MANY JOKERS, ALL WILD 

Stalemate on the means of implementation section and subsequent
breakdown of negotiations prompted a number of verdicts on the process.
Some participants noted a lack of political leadership from the Bureau.
This left much of the management of the meeting to the CSD/ PrepCom
Secretariat, which lacked both the manpower and substantive expertise to
handle some of the tasks. To many observers, these difficulties were
compounded by a failure to adopt the secretariat model used for UNCED in
1992, which made better use of seconded staff, agencies, and regional
representatives and a division of labor between political and
administrative expertise. Along these lines, a running theme during PrepCom
IV was the way in which UN agencies were sidelined in the process. One
agency that had produced a lengthy proactive response to the implementation
plan was advised to simply submit it to the Secretariat's website. 

Many participants pointed out that the conduct and observance of
procedure in the various working and contact groups did not rise to the
occasion, with time lost in confusion over meeting organization, an
unprecedented number of redundant interventions and uncertain gaveling or
reopening of issues. 

On Tuesday of the second week, reports began to circulate about the
consultation format adopted by Chair Salim's Friends of the Chair group,
which consisted of a troika made up of the EU, the US and the G-77/China
(Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil and Venezuela). A number of delegations,
including Australia, Canada, Switzerland and Norway, reported that they had
been frozen out of the discussions. After protests from delegations, new
arrangements were put in place to allow some countries to alternate and/or
participate under the "Vienna" rules first introduced during the
negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, whereby one speaker
presents views on behalf of each interest and/or regional group.

Identifying where the impact of procedural obstacles ends and political
deadlock begins is always a problem; one high-level observation on this
quandary rings true. The complexity and empowerment of the sustainable
development agenda (seeking to institutionalize a meaningful conversation
between finance, trade and environment discourses) presents a unique
challenge to the multilateral system at the United Nations. The problem has
outgrown the system; a fact that is reflected in the agenda item on
sustainable development governance.

EVERYTHING TO PLAY FOR 

Attention will now shift to the Johannesburg Summit itself. One of the
outstanding achievements of the UNCED process is the birth of the Kyoto
Protocol process. A reference to the Protocol's entry into force, alas,
will also be one of the more contentious issues that will be sent to the
WSSD. The Australian Prime Minister announced on World Environment Day
(Wednesday, 5 June) that his country would not ratify the Protocol at this
time. It was a particularly infuriating moment for those NGOs in Bali who
fought in support of Norway's campaign to have a resolute paragraph urging
ratification of the Protocol, to ensure its entry into force. The US
resisted on the grounds that, while not wishing to obstruct other
countries, it could not lend its name to a call for the ratification of an
instrument that does not enjoy its support. 

The announcement that Japan had ratified the Protocol was better news. And
there is intense speculation about the intentions of the President of the
Russian Federation. On a recent trip to Germany, he is reported to have
whispered a reassuring line to WWF campaigners: "Wir Machen Mit" (we're
with you). 

Problems will also continue until the hot political issues of finance,
trade and means of implementation are resolved. The newly proposed
time-bound targets, such as halving by 2015 the number of people without
access to sanitation and significantly reducing the loss of biological
diversity, are likely to continue to be held hostage. Another problematic
target would see a review by 2007 of progress in developed countries on
phasing out energy subsidies. Also in brackets is a target to restore
depleted fish stocks by 2015. The timing of and commitment to new
programmatic work on areas such as sustainable consumption and production
and energy for developing countries, particularly in Africa, together with
action-oriented text on sanitation, are likely to be impacted by the wider
discussions on finance and means of implementation. For the moment,
important elements on the programmatic work remain in brackets. 

The WSSD will not be free from the risk of derailment as a result of the
introduction of highly contentious political issues of the day, notably the
divisions in international opinion over the United States' shift to a
unilateralist agenda. Without a resolution on text dealing with the issue
of unilateral coercive measures, the problem of good governance will be
reopened at the Summit by the developing countries that are insisting on
keeping a balance between good governance at both domestic and
international levels. New funding initiatives, including a world solidarity
fund to tackle poverty, and GEF financing for the UNCCD, will meet stiff
opposition. Resolution of these and other outstanding issues will likely
depend upon the outcomes on the means of implementation section.

JUST A BLUFF?

After several informal consultations and numerous explanatory notes
issued since PrepCom II, the concept of and positions on partnerships
have become more concretized. Questions on whether there will be
established principles for partnerships have turned to demands by some
Major Groups for prerequisites. The US is clearly prioritizing Type 2 as a
key Summit outcome, while the G-77/China is wary that such initiatives will
be a means of imposing conditionalities and circumventing government
commitments on means of implementation. 

Differences among the Major Groups have also surfaced through the
Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues. Perspectives on partnerships range from the
enthusiasm of business and industry champions, support from local
government organizations, and calls for selection criteria and frameworks
by NGOs. Within the NGO community there are organizations involved in
fieldwork, while others focus on campaigns and policy. Attitudes to
partnerships are somewhat influenced by the nature of a particular NGO's
activities. Partnerships and pragmatism are regular features of the work of
those NGOs working in the field on research on sustainable livelihoods,
poverty and eco-system management linkages. 

Responding to the concerns of delegates, the Vice-Chairs have produced a
series of explanatory notes, with the most recent note including principles
and framework criteria. Partnerships have also been a recent focus of the
Secretariat, which produced its set of guidelines on Partnerships on Energy
for Sustainable Development, as the first in a series to address Water,
Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity (WEHAB) - the priority
sectoral issues identified by UN Secretary-General. These concerns have
caused the Bureau to continually reassure delegates that Type 1 outcomes
would be the most important product of the WSSD, as the subject of Type 2
outcomes became more politicized throughout the session. Yet partnerships
are slated to be a, if not the, key outcome of the Johannesburg Summit,
according to some countries.

LAYING YOUR CARDS ON THE TABLE

Elements for a political declaration at the WSSD were discussed during an
Informal Plenary, a ministerial-level exchange, and behind closed doors.
With many unresolved issues in the Draft Plan of Implementation, Chair
Salim was careful not to allow a full negotiation to develop on the content
of the declaration. 

Although an actual draft declaration was not considered during this
session, there is speculation that it may become the platform for
reintroducing the issues that have fallen out of the implementation
plan, a prospect that became evident with "in-the-corridor" suggestions
that the issues of foreign occupation, coercive unilateral measures and
ethics for sustainable development may be moved there. Progress on agreeing
on elements for the Political Declaration is likely to influence decisions
by some Heads of State and Government regarding their attendance at the
Summit.

There is also some speculation that the Declaration may provide the most
authoritative and decisive place to deal with the core trade and finance
issues. 

UP THE WSSD SLEEVE

The collapse of negotiations on implementation issues will add to the
pressures on those charged with the management of the WSSD process,
notably the South African hosts. With uncertainty and political risk now
associated with significant sections of the agenda, the "Summit" status of
the meeting cannot be taken for granted, despite some early commitments
from world leaders such as the UK's Tony Blair.

A number of upcoming meetings present an opportunity for South Africa to
cultivate interest in the Summit and take soundings on the way forward.
These are the G-8 Summit in Canada, the World Food Summit+5 in Rome, a
meeting of the EU leadership in Seville, the launch of the African Union,
to be chaired by South Africa, and a mini-summit in Rio when the "Earth
Summit torch" will be handed over from Brazil to South Africa. A number of
Heads of State and Government are expected to attend this last event and
issue a call for peers to come to Johannesburg. Still, there are concerns
that without the personal involvement of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as
well, South African President Mbeki's efforts at these Summits may turn out
to be a mere ripple in a puddle.

The intersessional period will also be marked by high profile civil
society preparations. By collapsing the negotiations around some of the
more emotive and clear-cut issues, negotiators have done the NGOs something
of a favor by providing a focus for their campaigns on terms of trade,
globalization, debt and finance for the environment and development. An
indication of the possible scale of protest in Johannesburg was the launch
in Bali of a million-signature petition drive under the anti-globalization
slogan: "We the peoples believe another world is possible." 

A ROYAL FLUSH?

As Heads of State and Government contemplate whether to journey to
Johannesburg, everyone must bear in mind the lesson of PrepCom IV:
developing countries will seize the opportunity of the WSSD to ensure
that commitments on finance, trade and capacity building exist, are
meaningful and are action-oriented. Key to meeting the developing
countries' demands will be the transformation of the Monterrey Consensus
into an action agenda, and the delivery of political commitments set out in
the Doha Declaration.

Critical benchmarks for the success of the WSSD will be the achievement of
a coherent approach to establishing a working relationship between the
sustainable development policy community and the programme outcomes of Doha
and Monterrey. In other words, there needs to be an institutionalization of
the conversation (and the conflict) on and convergence of the three pillars
of sustainable development. At the core of that conversation - if
confidence is to be restored in the post-UNCED agenda - will be an
authoritative commitment to fairness in a fragile world. 

 
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