The big true story of Genua and the "Black Block"

a more general reflection on the days in genua, viewed by a german militant

Sven Glueckspilz, Berlin, 13th of august 2001

This is a translation by myself with all my poor knowledge of english and a small dictionary. Please don't blame me for rough phrases.

Short remark: I don't like this term of "anti-globalization-movement". It doesn't match our political intention. Therefore I use in the following the term "global non-parlamental opposition" (GNPO).

Let's go write down the history of the Genua summit. How is it going to look like? Maybe this way?
200.000 people gathered to demonstrate peacefully. Same time, about 400 masked persons appeared, an organized "Black Block". This block consisted of policemen, fascists and a small part of confused, mostly german, rioters. The block could do for two days it's destructive work in Genua, undisturbed by police. It attacked peaceful demonstrators and destroyed systematically small shops an cars, leaving behind a damage of about 50 million dollars. Wherever it appeared, police dashed back and brutally attacked peaceful demontrators instead. When the work was done, the "Black Block" retreated in a carabienri-barrack or wasted, as a kind of chill-out, a building that was left by the city of Genua for demonstrators as a sleeping place. In the end, the secret strategic goal of this operation was reached: the public did not talk any longer about the political intentions of the demonstrators or of the GNPO, but cursed the violence of the militant leftists.

A lot of people were involved in producing this image in the days after Genua: eye-witnesses, affected ones, but also political representatives of the "moderate" left or liberal media.

It's a case of things coming together that do not match: individual cases, wishful thinking or fear, political convictions and analysis, conspiracy theories and rumour, all of that held together by the one need: to find a short, simple explanation for a complicated, inconsistent reality.

My history of Genua looks different. In this history, all of the individual cases being told exist, but in the end the resulting mosaic is not an image of strategies and conspiracies.

The key issue is, who were the militants, what did they do, and how did the police react.

The run-up to the summit: it was clear long before, that Genua was going to be the climax of GNPO-mobilisation till now. The movement had grown rapidly since Seattle. It is strong especially in Italy. The whole italian non-parlamental left has increased over the last years. The law concerning demonstrations is quite liberal, the society is used to street protests. Nearly everyone living in the European Union may reach northern Italy easily. It's summer, an it's time of vacations.
So, it was clear long before that a very large number of people would come to Genua.
The mobilisation became even stronger due to the media, greedy for spectacular events at every summit at the latest since Seattle 1999. At last, what happened in Goeteborg gave another big push forward. In some way, supposedly not intended, Goeteborg was kind of a test for Genua. It showed - among other things - that the mass media would willingly dismiss even gunfire at demonstrators (okay, all the same: militant demonstrators) and crawle into the arse of the self-appointed guardians of moral and good manners, law and order, when they are going to open up the hunt.

Already in advance, Genua was imagined as a decisive battle. But this imagination would become concrete in different ways. It could mean, the political pressure of the GNPO woul make future G8-summits impossible at all. Or, the character of the summits would have to change. Or, the GNPO-movement would get a decisive strike in the neck. Or, the escalation would become uncontrollable. I expected the latter. And I havent't been the only one who reckoned with a critical situation, including even casualties. I was ready for this risc, also for my own person.

In the days before the summit, the political pressure on the GNPO was increased. The well-known horror-scenarios were put on the scene, reciprocal raising one another. In Berlin we know this situation. In 1988, in the run-up to the IMF-summit, police and government announced the "crushing of the autonomous scene" months before the event. Lots of activists were intimidated by that announcement and spent the nights of the summit disguised in hotels rather than at home. Or, another example: in 2000, short time before the traditional First-of-may-demonstration with its traditional riots, the Berlin minister of the interior Werthebach sorrowful proclaimed that casualties were expected. Nothing of that kind happened, anyway.
The mass media, known for their constant amnesia, love this kind of agitation and willingly spread it all over. The intention is clear: people shall be put off from joining the actions, and brutal repression shall be justified in advance. In case nothing of the predicted happens, it will look like the success of the security strategy. Same procedure as every year...
The fears concerning the actions of european police were confirmed when they proclaimed the tightening up of inner-euopean borders and kind of a town-arrest for some activists. Genua became a dangerous place in the days before the summit. There were controls and arrestings and even some first cases of police violence with fascist-like background. Also there happened to be some cases of terrorism, which raised the memory of the italian "strategy of tension" of the 1970s, the former attacks of fascist and/or police provocateurs.
However, the GNPO partly joined in this game of stirring up feelings. The extreme police brutality in Seattle and now in Goeteburg played its part in the expections of bad and worse things to happen. For example, the preparation of body bags is quite normal at a large event like a summit, but it was kind of a frightening report when passing on in left circles. At least in germany, everyone expected hundreds or thousands of people blocked at the frontier, arrested in Italy or get detained in some other way.

Unexpectedly, the borders proved leaky. Although the journey to Genua would last long, most of the people reached the town at last and were able to find places to sleep and care for themselves. Genua was in state of emergency, but not in state of siege. In the days before the weekend, people were busy with getting sorted. Those who did not belong to the bigger organisations were trying to organise sleeping places, food, supply and equipment, and they were looking for friends and political comrades. Already at this time it showed out clear that the domination of the GSF and the GSF's clear position against militant action and militants would lead to conflicts. There were some meetings of smaller groups, and some attempts of organisation beside the dominant groups, but they led to no more than general arrangements concerning e.g. gathering places.
Thursday passed exactly like it was planned: amongst other things there was the big demonstration of and for immigrants, parties and good vibrations. All present militants agreed with the peaceful character of this day.
There were no police or fascist provokateurs to take the excellent opportunity: rampaging at the first day would have broken the GNPO's concept in pieces at once. The situation would have become confused and sharpened, police action at the camps and gathering points, attacks against arriving GNPO-activists before they could form up would have had legitimation.

On friday, hundreds or maybe already thousands of militants were situated in Genua. They had come from many different countrys, mostly of course from Italy, but also from Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain. They had no organised structur nor a common concept. They were brought together only by their political intention: the summit had to be attacked, not only in words, but real, by attacking the red zone - and so the police, defending this zone. (Nearly) everyone would clearly see that there was no real chance to get some Bush, Berlusconi or Schroeder. Obviously, the police would shoot at militants breaking through into the red zone. Who doubted this, even after Goeteborg, was naive beyond hope. So also the militant action would be a symbolic attack, but with a clear message: we are not satisfied with critical speech and waved flags. There is no bridge that we as militants would take to the Katzentisch (what's this in english??) of the power. We dont't want to be accepted as an NGO. We dont't want to present any suggestions how WTO or IMF could be improved. In our eyes, the whole world economic system is a piece of shit. Alternatives? We, like anyone else, don't have a proposal that works for sure. No-one may tell us about another world bank president, an international tax on capital, a red-green (social-democratic) "aid for developing" or a somewhat stricter Kyoto-protocol helping against the misery of people. We feel that something new has to be tested, cause all the big plans have failed. And this people sitting at there conference tables in peace, protected by walls an police, will try to prevent this with all violence they have got. Therefore the violence has to be brought back to their tables.
Certainly, within the militants exist quite different political identities and intentions. There are people (like e.g. me) who see militant action as a catalysator, pushing political subjects in the public, although these subjects are often represented by moderate leftists, with whom I disagree in several points. Other militants don't care at all cause they think they are strong enough themselves and all this reformist talking is bullshit or worse. Again others don't think about that stuff, cause they are just full of rage and fight their very own personal struggle against the ruling system of society. Finally, the indistinct edges of the militant scene are populated by some people in opposition against "politics" at all, right or left, state or opposition, and just celebrating their subculture.

As I wrote before: the militants didn't have any working structure, no plan, except "to the red zone". There were single groups arranged with others, rather spontaneous than long planned, and there were lots of complete un-organised couples and single persons. There was small prepared equipment and few gathering points. Especially many of those who came from far away had no material (cause they hadn't expected at all they could bring it safe to Genua) and no common campground (cause they expected police attacks). They spent the short time of preparation mostly by dealing with this lacks. The attempts of arrangements with organisations in order to join them at their gathering places were not very successful. All the partly well-meaning, partly hostile reports of the big plans and perfect strategies of the militants are - unfortunately - not true.
Not even the question if the decisive attack against the red zone should take place friday or saturday was answered.
On friday all this showed up quite clear. One of the few widespread agreed concepts of the GNPO was the beginning of the direct actions on friday at 2 p.m. But in the southeast of the red zone, first clashes began already at 1 p.m. And it was not the police starting it, but militants smashing a bank. It turned then out that the militants were rather bad organised and bad prepared, as in this initial stages riot police could easily push them back and scatter the crowd. In the time that followed, militants spread out chaotically in groups towards the north and the south. The police stayed kind of passive and practiced their "forward-defence" of the red zone: they held their battle stand by masses of tear-gas and single attacks, giving up control over more distant events. So, many militants felt that the situation had already cleared up after the first hour of fighting. The balance of power was way unequal so that the attack of the red zone was rather like an attempt of militant blowing horns at the walls of jericho, hoping they would crumble. That means, the single attacks against the police and the destroying and looting would create the image of militant streetfighting, making it politically effective, but no serious attack against the red zone was carried out. There was no "black block", but a mess of different people, in black or coloured clothes, masked or un-masked: dedicated militants; people just exploding in spontaneous rage; non-violent activists in self-defence; town inhabitants as autonoms by opportunity; pissed nihilists... the actions were correspondingly, precisely or just not. People throwing rocks for political reasons will in general aim at their target more precisely than people who get violent out of momentary rage against police brutality or out of some blurred mix of tension, adventure and opportunity. Stones are often thrown quite blindly, hitting other demonstrators, windows, cars. By the way, don't forget the police also causes lots of damages during their operations. But, also, militants have sometimes missed their targets...

The spreading out of the riots all over the town was a result of the actual situation and not of a planned concept! But, of course, other people and their concepts were affected by this. Probably, the demonstration of the tute bianche would have been stopped by police violence anyway. But the situation got much more confused and un-controllable by the fact that the place of this confrontation had already been the scene of riots and the militants met and partly mixed with tute bianche. The police (and their leaders) also partly acted confused, they attacked and retreated; pursued militants, beating up everyone in the street, even a peaceful streetparty; shooting gas in such capacities that even policemen with gas masks nearly puked. Maybe the police had believed their own horror scenarios more than anyone else and their defensive stand in the beginning was a result of expecting much more massive attacks that did not occur and could not occur cause the lack of an appropriate prepared enemy. That would help to understand why the police acted inconsistent, retreating at one place (or just not showing up), hitting people badly at another. Not to forget the fact that there were different police squads with different motivation, skills, command and fascist contamination. And there is the problem of manoeuvring such a large army - even the very experienced Berlin police came in trouble at the first-of-may-riot 2001, when thousands of anti-riot-cops blocked themselves in Kreuzberg.
The shooting of Carlo Giuliani was the logical climax of this chaotically escalation and broke it's peak. The tute bianche decided to draw back. The alternative would have been the risk of more casualties, cause on both sides there was much hate, fear and confusion, easily leading to further escalations. There were rumours about more deaths and shooting police, and there were at the other hand already violent actions that could not be tolerated even by militants.

There were probably another sort of "militants" present in Genua: under-cover-agents e.g., existing in every radical movement (also in absolutely non-violent ones); hooligans and fascists, that like to do some violent adventure protected by the crowds around; ideological provokateurs, trying to discredit the militants by terrorist actions; but how many of them? and which kind of influence did they really have in this days? I presume, they were a small number and did not have much influence. The photographs presented until now show nothing but quite normal cops in civil clothing, not even well disguised. They are, sad enough, quite normal and daily seen as "beat-up-squads" at demonstrations. The circulating "reports" on number and importance of the provocateurs are, I bet, way overdone and consist of half-knowledge, rumours and quite subjective interpretations.

The conspiracy theory dealing with masked provocateurs is rather old and appears every time the whole broad spectrum of the political left meets at big political events.There are mainly three groups of lefts who hold this theory: First, communists who see provocation in everything not meeting their own strategies - they do not reject political violence in general, but think that now is the wrong time for it. Second, liberal lefts, above all representatives of organisations and movements. They believe in opportunities of influence within the rules of the system and maybe in personal careers. Their egocentric mind leads them to believe all political violence is a planned intrigue against their ambitions. Third, non-violent activists, who are on their high horse, meaning to control the true doctrine. They state left politics have always to be non-violent, therefore logically nobody belongs to the left who practices otherwise. By the way: Martin Luther, the famous european reformer, agitatet in 1525 or so against the "murderish and lootish farmers mob", after the uprising of this very mob had brought him to considerable political power.

A part of conspiracy theories is to give own observations or suspicions more importance than they really have. One may in fact meet a masked provocateur (be it a policeman acting planfully or a pissed punk who doesn't care about anything), but cannot accept the fact that this was only a small single story to happen. Thus quickly a scenario is built where provocateurs "lead" or "direct" the scene.

Back to Genua. The night following friday was full of tension and exhaustion. Many were shocked and done in: by police brutality, by the dimension and fierceness of the fightings, by the massive gas firing, by conflicts with non-violents (who sometimes did not stay non-violent at all), by terrorising reports about deaths and injured. And there was uncertainty about things to come: would police be going to attack the camps, would they prohibit demonstration on saturday, would the fightings escalate even more, would there be more casualties? Few people had enough power and time to make an analysis of the day and plan for saturday. Even less to find arrangements with other groups.

The militants wanted to join the big demonstration, if possible as a block for their own. On one hand, they tried not to be blocked off by the liberal groups, but on the other hand they still wanted to attack the red zone and the police. It was quite clear after friday's escalation that the separation within the left had increased, concerning the question what to do now: there were less people hesitating, more militants and more non-violents. Mind the fact that 195.000 non-militants are not equal 195.000 non-violents - among them are a lot of undecided ones, or they approve of militance without practicising it for themselves, and there are many who believe to be peaceful until the moment they get first time beaten up by police... On saturday, thousands were full of rage, with the shooting of Carlo Giuliani and in general with the police terror of friday.

Police had changed their tactics. Supposedly there had been political pressure. Reports of militants running wild, undisturbed by police, of lootings and fire-raising, were in the whole somewhat exaggerated, but the police leaders couldn't be comforted. In the eyes of police it looked like thousands of militants had permitted themselves too much and tenthousands of demonstrators had mostly given them cover. The police had had right from the start kind of general pardon in advance for any sort of terror, and now they put it into practice declaring everyone an enemy who showed up in the area of conflicts. Not to overlook the fact that there were tenthousands (mainly in the northern part of the demonstration) who were not bothered by the clashes and at the most smelled teargas from the distance.
But the southern part of the demonstration was beaten up. Like it is in similiar conflicts, afterwards there's a lot of talking about "who started" and no clear decision about that question. The answer is important for those who understand political violence only as a direct self-defence against police attacks. But it's a fact that there would have been clashes anyway. In the end it's insignificant if there was a flying stone or a tear-gas bullet first. The militants didn't even manage to build a block of their own, they nearly directly slided back into the chaotic confrontations of the day before. Some groups attacked the police, others stayed more defensive and built barricades, and the police prepared for the big counter-attack. They started their vengeance for friday, and this vengeance stroke militants as well as lots of people who had no participation in friday's fightings. On the other hand, the officials of the moderate groups had big problems with holding back their young ones from throwing rocks and often failed with their efforts.

The day went by as chaotically as friday. The red zone was even farer from reach for the militants than before, but that was not so bad: what should they have done if some scattered lots would have broken through? They would have been massacred. The political goal of the militant was reached already on friday. It had been proved that only by military force a summit of the people in power could be done and defended, and that the GNPO-movement has a strong militant option. An opposing movement only then has a chance of getting political strength when the people in power have to fear this option of militance. No politician and no big banker will be impressed by 500.000 peace-demonstrators as long as there is no doubt they are going to stay non-violent all the time. Only the possibility of radicalisation makes a movement dangerous and by that strong.

The price is the splitting within the movement. That showed up already in advance, but especially on saturday. The moderate and the radical wing are too far apart from each other, there is no way of doing their own thing side to side on the same streets. Militants are naive if they claim the possibility of reciprocal respect. Our militance has very concrete effects on other ones. It is true, that police encroachments happen even without street fightings. But is is also true that police violence increases heavily after street fightings and doesn't hit only the militants. Police takes brutal revenge, often meeting spectators and unexperienced (while the militants know best when to retreat).

On saturday evening it seemed as if all could end in a political draw. The militant action had given the GNPO all the audience it needed. Far from being fully covered by "violence reports" - as the liberal left use to claim - the political contents were reported. The militant actions had instead ousted the reports of the official G8 summit party. A great part of the media hurried to explain the "originally" intentions of the GNPO-movement that were now allegedly discredited by the "violent anarchists". On the other hand, the ditches within the GNPO, already to be seen in Goeteborg, had become deeper, there had been violence between demonstrators, thousands were injured and exhausted and a man was dead. It was a dear cost for a momentary political victory getting more clear in the future. There was and will be an enormous pressure from above and from the media to force the moderate wings in order to split them from the radicals. And many of them seemed to be willingly to give way or to obey in advance.
Then the raid of the Diaz-school and the International Media-Center IMC happened.

Saturday evening, the situation in Genua was something between "we got through" and "what may follow". Further police attacks against camps and sleeping places were expected. Many of the militants changed place, driven by rumours of approaching raids or just out of unsecure feelings. Of course one had to consider that police had checked over the days where to find the militants. And there already had been police actions against camps (e.g. against greek anarchists, as I heard).
Some that had participated in the riots looked for shelter at places that were considered safer cause they belonged more or less to the GSF. That was the case with the Diaz-school and the IMC. Police doesn't know everything, they catch some informations and miss others. And they have their own conspiracy theories, smelling some secret alliances between militants and moderates. Police had already before the raid concentrated on the german activists as allegedly leading rioters, and they knew probably that many germans were going to the Diaz-school or already were staying there. So it may well be that they at first truely believed they had identified a center of militants. The attack's incredible brutality is hard to explain in other ways (did they beat the peaceful bag, meaning the kicking donkey?). It's quite near to real life (though less exciting conspicious) to assume that the special police squads wanted to take very concrete revenge for the last two days and that they planned to beat up straight the german militants; also, that they got out of control, driven by (fascistoid) hatred and over the days increased tension; least, that they had explicit backing from above: don't worry, we clear everything up, we control the media, who cares about some black block troublemakers? And then they hit (mostly?) the "wrong" ones... It may still be possible that the beating of peaceful folks instead of militants was on purpose. If so, one would have to assume a background strategy of intimidating moderate lefts by terror, forcing them to isolate the militants, so to say: separate from the black block, else we will kill you. I prefer the first, less complicated explanation. It's mostly the simple stories that tell the truth.

The raid of the school and the IMC was backfiring at the actors also because there were some unwelcome witnesses and affected ones. The media doesn't like beaten journalists, may it otherwise be in love with the government or not. Also a senator as witness is unfavourable. The shooting of Carlo Giuliani had been taken as a collateral damage, also the police violence of saturday, but the school raid was the little bit too much. Quite a lot of the media changed view and helped turning the political draw in favour of the GNPO for the moment. I say "for the moment", because I ain't sure about that. On the long run the intimidating effect of the terror may be stronger than present rage and defiance. Won't a lot of people ask themselves, before the next coming action, if they could stand anything like Genua a second time? Won't the moderate groups fall back in their known position of separation, won't they - openly or not - blame the militants for police terror?

The first signals, e.g. from GSF speakers, sounded very much like this. But recently, there were some encouraging signs, e.g. from ATTAC germany. We need to discuss the possibilities of common forms of action, and we should not expect an agreement. But it may be at least possible to agree on what really happened in Genua and what has to be turned down as rumour, imagination, fiction or speculation. This could be a basis for the discussion of how further actions could look like.

This is my resume of the days in Genua.


• The escalation of streetfighting was, the latest after Goeteborg, foreseeable.
  
• There was no "black block" at all.
  
• Militants should refuse the term "black block". It may be associated - especially in Italy - with uncanny violators and (fascist) terror.
  
• The militants were badly or not at all organised.
  
• The streetfighting was started and mostly leaded by militants, not by provocateurs.
  
• Thousands participated in the riots, many of them not in black clothing nor masked, not original militants nor provocateurs.
  
• Police acted brutally against everyone, militant or peaceful.
  
• The police tactics on friday were kind of defensive. So a lot of militant actions coul take place undisturbed.
  
• On saturday, the police changed to offensive tactics and attacked anyone in reach of their clubs - again, militants as well as peaceful ones.
  
• There have been policemen in civil clothing, mostly squads that beated and arrested.
  
• There were some disguised policemen and fascists involved in the riots. If they had a political strategy, it was to discredit militant actions by antisocial terror.
  
• Beside that, militants too have to take responsibility for mistakes and bad actions.
  
• The raid of Diaz-school was backed from above, if not planned before. It was probably done to hit the german militants.
  
• The massive police brutality had the goal of intimidating moderate parts of the movement and separate them from the more radical parts. The result of this concept will prove in the future.
  
• Genua was a political success of the whole GNPO-movement, at a dear cost and without certainty for further course. A backlash is as probable as an increasing mobilisation.
  
• Genua won't be repeated in this shape. The year of 2001 was probably the last year for the world's strategists to prepare their summits without much consideration of possible protests. Summits in the Rocky Mountains, in Saudi-Arabia or on aircraft carriers are going to look different.
  

In my eyes, there is a central insight: Genua showed a limit of mobilisation and capacities of political actions. So much people, from such different (political) origins, with most different forms of organisation and different kinds of action, merge to an uncontrollable volcano to sit on. Everything, good or bad, strengthens immensely and will be felt more intensive. No-one may overview the whole of the events, let alone grasp or control them: no funcionary of GSF, no Tute Bianche, no militant, no provocateur, no police leader.
There is a limit that militant street fightings reached some times before in the past - also in Italy. Crossing over these limits leads to military conflict. Today like in 1977 in Italy (armed demonstrations of the Autonomia-movement) the consequence is clear: the escalation has to be pulled back, otherwise the movement will be smashed. For the trial of strength in europe today is waged and won by the state and not by the revolutionary movement. The police started to escalate the situation already in Seattle with this very intention: force us into a more and more tough fight, that we can't stand for long, having not even matching structures. For, as I said, there is not only no organised "black block" (as even the italian courts meanwhile seem to admit), there is in fact no structure of the militants at all that could resist any serious official repression.
Therefore an analysis of the balance of power should be made at the start of all militant actions, and the possible renunciation of escalation should be part of the strategies of all militants. This happens very rarely, for - as indicated above - "the" militants are a hotchpotch without strategies, in which quite different motivations join. You won't spend your time with strategic considerations if you are young and angry, feeling very strong and important, half rebelling still against your parents, half already against the system of society. The effect is, unfortunately, a militant movement not developing strategies and tactics, but consisting of exactly those people who agree with the present actions. People who change their minds use to leave the movement instead of changing it.
Therefore it is nearly impossible to get to binding arrangements about further common actions with other parts of the GNPO-movement. Nobody may represent the militant wing for real.
We as militants need the background of thousands who at least tolerate our actions; the GNPO-movement as a whole needs its militant, overthrowing option, unless it likes to be strangled by the social-democratic hug. Future mobilisations by the GNPO have to deal with possible (not: inevitable) militant actions as well as with brutal police.
It clearly isn't easy under this circumstances to take common actions with people who still believe in reforms and influence, maybe even hope for participation in government (or even power?). For them, we are a future menace, and they are the same for us. This distrust is, more or less subliminal, present in all the talks about violence. What kind of politics is discredited by violence? If it is the politics that aim at sharing the present power, they already are discredited in our view. This sort of view leads many militants in a dead end by believing the whole moderate left is lost to reformism, especially the organisations. They lose the respect for the acting people and disparaging call them "useful idiots" of the social-democratics, just like the other way around some of them call us "useful idiots" of the police.
The GNPO-movement can only then get stronger (or survive) if it stands this tension. Otherwise it will inevitable be split in a radical wing, going to be isolated, dragged down and smashed, and a reformistic wing, going to be fobbed off by lip services, corruption and lies. To stand the tension it is necessary that every faction has the chance to do its own actions. This also means that non-violent groups should have the possibility to demonstrate the way they want without being hindered by our militant actions and the following police actions. Militant actions, if organised, have to take care that other people are not affected seriously. If police attacks by themselves, they should have no chance to blame us for it. On the other hand the non-violents should come to a complex view and ignore the permanent pressure of dissociation, done by media and state politics. If police states the need of beating up all the demonstrators because they do not dissociate from others, rioting elsewhere, I'd expect the non-violents to encourage and say: no, why should I dissociate, I'm not in charge for that actions!
The question of violence is not to be "solved" within the GNPO-movement. To survive, it has to find methods of side-by-side-acting, not excluding each other.
We as militants can do our part in this by getting more recognizable and predictable, offering contact; by taking arrangements and obeying their mutual keeping; by not taking every opportunity for militant actions, but getting more tactically.

Much more could be said... but for now it is enough.
Short remark concerning myself: For 20 years acting within the Berlin radical left, social-revolutionary, autonom, subversive communications-guerilla. Check my earlier writings, e.g. in the "Interim"-periodical.

Sven Glueckspilz, 13.08.01
e-mail: glueckspilz@so36.net

 
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